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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF PRESENT CRIMINAL
ABORTION LAW*
INTRODUCTION
Abortion law has long been a strange breed in the annals of
American jurisprudence. A multitude of articles have been written
attacking the glaring inadequacies of current abortion laws and the
failure of legislatures to effectively deal with the problem.' Nevertheless,
strong arguments have also been urged in favor of the existing laws.2
The nature of this conflict was succinctly summarized by Chief Justice
Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court when he stated:
[W]hereas in most areas of criminal prohibition the fact of
evil is evident to most people, here there is evil or none at all
depending wholly upon a spiritual supposition, for while men
agree it is wrong to take life, yet knowing nothing about the
void before or after their earthly presence, they cannot agree
upon the point at which a living thing should be thought to be
human in its being.3
The number of American women who annually receive illegal
abortions is staggering. The most frequently cited estimate indicates
that between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 illegal abortions are performed
each year.' Dr. F. J. Taussig, a renowned expert in abortion law,
remarked that there is "no other instance in history in which there has
*This paper was originally prepared in fulfillment of seminar requirements at the
Valparaiso University School of Law. The author, Lawrence E. Allan, is presently a
third-year law student.
1. While most states have submitted revisions of abortion law to state legislatures,
only five states have actually enacted abortion reform: California, Colorado, North
Carolina, Maryland and Georgia. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (c) (2)
(West Supp. 1967) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch.40, art. 2, § 50 (1967) ; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 44.45 (1967) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1968) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101, 1102
(1968). All other states have expressly defeated abortion reform as New
Hampshire did in 1961, or tabled discussion until a more "convenient time." L. LADER,
ABORTION 111-16 (1966).
2. See Byrne, A Critical Look at Legalized Abortion, 41 L.A.B. BULL. 320
(1966); Byrne, ABORTION IN PERSPECTIVE, 5 DUQUESNE L. REv. 125 (1966); Drinan,
The Inviolability of the Right To Be Born, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 465 (1965); Quay,
Justifiable Abortion-Medical & Legal Foundations, 49 GEO. L.J. 173 (1960); Quay,
Justifiable Abortion-Medical & Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J. 395 (1961); Rein-
gold, Abortion Law Reform in New York: A Study of Religious, Moral, Medical and
Legal Conflict, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 290 (1967).
3. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 709 (1967).
4. L. LADER, supra note 1, at 2; Gold, Observation on Abortion, 13 WORLD MED. J.
76 (1966).
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been such a frank and universal disregard for a criminal law."' Although
defenders of present abortion laws argue that perjury and motor vehicle
violations are also overlooked but are nevertheless indispensible, such an
analogy does not seem valid since the "victim" of the abortion is the
woman upon whom the abortion is performed; and at the same time she
is the very person who desires the "crime" to be committed.6
This disrespect for the prevailing body of abortion law, it is sub-
mitted, indicates the need for a re-examination of the basis of such laws."
Since the enforcement of abortion law is inconsistent and the legislators
have failed to take any positive action to resolve the problem,' it is
suggested that a re-examination of the abortion dilemma should take place
in the courts. The basis of such re-evaluation may indeed center upon
unconstitutional aspects of the prevailing body of abortion law. It is the
purpose of this note to explore these constitutional questions.
INCEPTION AND EVOLUTION OF ABORTION STATUTES
Authorities disagree as to whether abortion law had its inception
in the common law or whether it originated in the various state statutes.
Justice McNaughton, in Rex v. Bourne,' maintained that it had never
been the position of English common law that a life could be taken.'"
Further, under common law, life did not begin until "quickening":
when movement of the fetus could be felt. 1 "Abortion," however, refers
to the expulsion or detachment of a pre-viable ovum. 2 Thus, it would
seem that laws prohibiting abortion (as we presently know them) had
their beginnings in state statutes.
The first American abortion law was enacted in Connecticut in
1821.3 As noted above, these statutes were a departure from English
common law. However, this departure was cushioned in 1828 when New
5. TAUSSIG, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED MEDICAL & SOCIAL ASPECTS
422 (1936).
6. Arguments can be made that the victim of abortion is the unborn fetus (foetus),
but while all courts do not accept that interpretation, the courts of every state have
indicated that abortion is at least a crime against the woman, Leavy & Kummer,
Criminal Abortion-Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 123,
134 (1962); JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, JR. FOUNDATION, THE TERRIBLE CHOICE: THE
ABORTION DILEMMA 62 (1968).
7. Reingold, supra note 2, at 291.
8. JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, JR. FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 62.
9. 3 All. E.R. 615 (K.B.) (1938) ; 1 K.B. 687 (1938) ; 108 L.J.K.B. 471 (1938).
10. Rex v. Bourne, 1 K.B. 687, 690 (1938).
11. Id.; ZABRISKE, OBSTETRICS FOR NURSES 543 (18th ed. 1960); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1415 (4th ed. 1951).
12. TAUSSIG, supra note 5, at 21.
13. L. LADER, sup'ra note 1, at 86 (Kentucky, after 1879; Connecticut, 1860;
Illinois, 1867; Iowa, 1878; New Hampshire, 1848; Virginia, 1848; New Jersey, 1849;
Arkansas, 1947; Mississippi, 1956; Rhode Island, 1896).
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York became the first state to recognize what today is termed the
therapeutic abortion. 4 A "therapeutic" abortion is a detachment or
expulsion of the pre-viable ovum in order to save a life. 5 Ohio followed
the example of New York in 1834;16 and Indiana and Missouri did
likewise in 1935.17 This trend continued and currently every state
recognizes some form of therapeutic abortion.'"
Carving out an exception in abortion law by means of permitting
therapeutic abortion does not, however, solve the basic problem. The
whole problem of illegal abortion is not touched by this exception. Also,
statutes allowing therapeutic abortion usually rely on the judgment of
individual or collective members of the medical profession to determine
if an abortion is necessary to save a life.'9 Unfortunately, medical,
as well as legal authorities, do not agree upon what conditions warrant a
therapeutic abortion.2"
Five states have attempted to remedy the existing ills of their
respective abortion laws since 1967: Colorado,2' North Carolina,2
California,"3 Maryland"4 and Georgia. 5 Each state has deviated only
14. L. LADER, supra note 1, at 87.
15. Application of Grand Jury of the County of Kings, 286 App. Div. 270, 272, 143
N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (1955 (emphasis added)-
16. L. LADER, supra note 1, at 87.
17. Id.
18. See Quay, supra note 2, at 395-520 for survey of American statutes. Louisiana
has a strange dichotomy. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.87 (1950) states that no abor-
tions are permitted, while LA. REv. STAT. § 37.1285 (1964) affords individual doctors
the discretion to abort patients.
19. See Quay, supra note 2, at 395-520.
20. Reasons for therapeutic abortion, as subdivided by Dr. Kenneth Niswander,
have four categories: (1) Medical Indications which include but are not limited to
cardiovascular disease, gastrointestinal disease, renal disease, neurological diseases,
pulmonary disorders, diabetes melitus, and malignancy; (2) Fetal Indications which
include but are not limited to rubella (German measles), radiation, genetic disorders,
erythroblastosis fetalis (anemia frequently caused by an unfavorable RH factor), and
harmful drugs such as thalidomide and folic acid; (3) Psychiatric Indications which
include but are not limited to suicidal reaction and severe psychotic reaction; and (4)
Socio-economic Indications which include but are not limited to childbirth, poverty,
care of existing family, medical reasons, and psychiatric reasons. Niswander, Medical
Abortion Practices in the United States, 17 W. REs. L. REV. 403, 407-14 (1965). A
recent note appearing in the Vanderbilt Law Review subdivides the medical-legal
indications in a slightly different fashion: physical indications include heart, kidney
and tuberculosic disorders; psychiatric indications include suicidal tendencies, severe
post-partum or antecedent mental illness, social significance, and emotional after-
effects of abortion; eugenic indications include disease, drug, or physical injury likely
to result in the birth of a deformed child; humanitarian indications include the un-
wanted child as the product of criminal or statutory rape. Note, Abortion Legislation:
The Need For Reform, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1313, 1322-26 (1967).
21. COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, art. 2 § 50 (1967).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44.45 (1967).
23. CAL. HEALTH & SAFrrY CODE § 25951(c) (2) (1967).
24. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (as amended July, 1968).
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101, 1102 (as amended July, 1968).
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slightly from the path suggested by the American Law Institute whose
Modern Penal Code permits:
[T]he legal termination of a pregnancy before the twelfth
week of gestation on three grounds: (1) medical (including
psychiatric conditions which might become severe if the
pregnancy were allowed to continue full term); (2) eugenic
(which would allow abortion if there were a likelihood that the
child would be born with serious mental or physical defects);
and (3) humanitarian (which would justify the termination of
a pregnancy which resulted from rape, incest or other felonious
intercourse)."
Thus, except for the five states mentioned above, abortion is allowed
in only one instance-to save a life. Whether a constitutional right of the
mother or the child is being violated is the question next considered.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Right to be Born
Perhaps the most dominant issue in a discussion of abortion law is
whether a non-viable fetus has a constitutional right to be born. Tradi-
tionally, the right to be born is not discussed in the light of constitutional
principles but rather in terms of morally desirable ends. Further, most
arguments which are morally, religiously or ethically oriented start and
end with an unequivocal affirmative or negative position on the issue.
Often both opponents and proponents of the reform cite identical cases
as valid precedent for their respective views. 7
Certain areas of general agreement, however, do exist concerning
some rights of the unborn. One such right is inheritance.2" Another is
the right to compensation for tortious injury sustained at a prenatal
stage of development.2 Yet another is the "moral" right to be born.
The proponents of reform qualify this right, however, where birth of the
fetus would be detrimental to itself, to its mother or the family into
which it would be born." It should be noted that the primary right is
that of the fetus. The rights of other persons, i.e., mother, father and
physician, are determined by this right of the fetus.
26. Huddleston, The Law of Therapeutic Abortion: A Social Commentary on
,Proposed Reform, 15 J. PuB. LAW 386, 396 (1966), citing MODERN PENAL CODE §
230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
27. Byrne, The Abortion Question: A Nonsectarian Approach, 11 CATHOLIC
LAW 316, 318 (1965).
28. ATKINSON, WiLLs 75 (2d ed. 1953).
29. PROSSER, TORTS 354-57 (3d ed. 1964).
30. Drinan, supra note 2, at 469.
31. Id.
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Opponents of Reform
Compelling arguments have been advanced by those who support
the status quo of abortion law. They maintain that the fetus has the right
to recover for injuries at both the viable and pre-viable stages of pre-natal
development. 2 Thus a fetus was found to have a right to life where a
New Jersey court stayed the execution of a pregnant woman until after
childbirth.3 This position was subsequently fortified by another New
Jersey case which compelled a Jehovah's Witness expectant mother to
receive a blood transfusion to save the life of a fetus."
Two recent decisions further support the position of the opponents
to reform. In 1965 a Connecticut court found that life begins at con-
ception"3 and an Ohio decision held that a viable fetus is a "person"
under the Ohio Constitution.36
In relation to the child's right to be born, a parent's right to be free
from emotional or financial burdens, according to the arguments of
opponents to reform, seems clearly subordinate. Thus, a New Jersey court
refused recovery to the parents of a defective child against a doctor and
his hospital where the parents alleged that the mother had contracted
rubella during pregnancy and that the doctor had failed to inform the
parents of the consequent likelihood of bearing a defective child and there-
by precluded any decision by the parents to abort. The court held that
public policy prohibits such action. Judge Proctor indicated that he
felt the action was one for "wrongful life." Continuing, he said:
The right to life is inalienable in our society. A court cannot
say what defects should prevent an embryo from being allowed
life such that denial of a defective child in embryo can support
a cause for action. 8
The underlying rationale of the proponents of existing abortion
law was succinctly expressed by Judge Porter when he stated:
Though we sympathize with the unfortunate situation in which
these parents find themselves, we firmly believe the right of
32. ATKINSON, supra note 28; Wood v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691
(1951); Marion Tramways Co. v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933); Kelley v. Gregory,
282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.E.2d 696 (3d Dept. 1953).
33. State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52, 51 Am. Dec. 77 (1849).
34. Raleigh-Fitkin Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421,
201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 985 (1964).
35. Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1965).
36. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334
(1949).
37. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
38. 227 A.2d at 693.
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their child to live is greater than and precludes their right not to
endure emotional and financial injury."
Another problem involved in reformation of existing abortion law,
according to the opponents of reform, concerns due process in relation
to the child's right to be born. One authority has expressed this argument
against reform by stating:
We are dealing with three parties when a pregnancy occurs
because of rape or incest-the victim, the offender, and the
unborn child. The criminal offender cannot be punished without
the essentials of due process of law; a speedy and just trial, an
able defense. Yet legalizing abortion in these cases would permit
the taking of life of the unborn child without some legal safe-
guards. The growing recognition of the rights of the unborn
child in other areas dictates that this innocent party-a human
being-be afforded the same consideration and protection of
due process."'
The opponents of reform, then, base their arguments in relation
to the right to be born on two considerations: 1) the child's right to
be born supercedes any right on behalf of the parent to forego emotional
or financial injury by having an abortion; and 2) to allow abortion for
reasons other than to save a life would violate due process of law afforded
the unborn child.
Proponents of Reform
The proponents of reform regard the non-viable fetus as having no
constitutional right to be born and, not unlike their adversaries, support
their position with precedent rather than sound reasoning. This position
was adopted by the proponents of the current California Therapeutic
Abortion Act 41 when they urged that the unborn child not be considered
a "person" within the rubric of the due process or equal protection of the
law sections of the Constitution securing these rights to all "persons."
This view is also supported by abortion laws which afford primary
protection to the mother with only residual benefits accuring to the fetus.
This is clearly demonstrated by observing that the death of the fetus is
not essential to a conviction for criminal abortion ;42 that a woman upon
whom an abortion is performed is considered neither a felon nor an
39. Id.
40. Herbert, Is Legalized Abortion the Solution to Criminal Abortion, 37 CoLo.
L. REv. 283, 285 (1965).
41. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951(c) (2) (1967).
42. Smith v. State, 160 Ind. 464, 67 N.E. 100 (1903).
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accomplice to the act ;"3 and that the unborn child may be destroyed if it
is necessary to save the life of the mother.4 4 Leavy and Kummer, in
their article,45 support this view: "The design of the (abortion) statute
was not to prevent the procuring of abortions so much as to guard the
health and life of the mother against the consequences of such attempts." 6
Leavy and Kummer would hold the life of the mother in greater
esteem than the life of the unborn fetus since they view the mother as a
full person. This view is supported, at least indirectly, by statutes and
decisions in various states holding that the abortee may frequently be
immunized from vulnerability to prosecution when her testimony is
required to convict the abortionist. 8 It has also been held that the
abortee is not an accomplice but a victim;4" that a miscarriage is not
required for a criminal abortion conviction;5° and that the supposed
abortee need not even have been pregnant in order to support a criminal
abortion conviction.51
The view of the proponents of reform is also supported by the laws
of New York state which appear to treat a non-viable fetus as a far less
important being than a living person. In New York, the killing of a living
human being is murder,52 a Class A felony,5" while the killing of a
fetus is manslaughter, 5 a Class E felony.
5
1
A review of legal history indicates that the fetus has been considered
an inferior entity with regard to standing as a human being ;56 no case
43. Rex v. Bourne, 1 K.B. 687 (1938).
44. State v. Murphey, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (1858).
45. See Leavy & Kummer, supra note 6.
46. Id. at 135-36.
47. Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE § 148, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
48. Note, The Law of Criminal Abortion: An Analysis of Proposed Reforms, 32
IND. L.J. 193 (1957) ; People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. App. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953).
49. Reingold, supra note 2, at 297.
50. People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. App. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953); People v. Wales,
136 Cal. App. 2d 846, 289 P.2d 305 (1955); State v. Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249, 121 A.2d
490 (1956); Schoenen v. Board of Medical Examiners, 54 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
51. MODEL PENAL CODE § 158, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956); 139 A.L.R.
993 (1942).
52. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1050 (1967).
53. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.25, 125.30 (1967).
54. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.40, 125.45 (1967).
55. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.40 (1967).
56. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual: and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as the infant is
able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and
with a potion or otherwise killith 'it in her womb, or if anyone beat her
whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child,
though this was not murder by the ancient law of homicide or manslaughter
.. an infant ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed
to be born in law for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a
surrender of a copyhold estate made to it. It may have a guardian assigned
et al.: Constitutional Aspects of Present Criminal Abortion Law
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has yet extended the Fourteenth Amendment to secure rights for the
unborn. Moral or ethical philosophy may regard the unborn as a human
being; but that human being has not been considered a "person" within
the contemplation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7
The above discussion has attempted to summarize the basic
arguments of the reform advocates. Both their position and that of the
opponents of reform are reasonably logical and appealing, but it would
appear that the reformists have the better constitutional position. The
view that the fetus has a "non-person" status is evidenced by the nature
of the criminal penalties,5" the absence of cases extending the rights of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the unborn, 9 and the conclusion reached
by the California investigation."0
While the Marion case, 1 which held that a fetus is a "person"
within the meaning of the Ohio Constitution, presents formidable super-
ficial resistance to this conclusion, that case was a civil suit for pre-natal
injuries and therefore has little relevance to constitutional considera-
tions.6
2
The Mother's Right to Self-Defense
In order to adequately discuss whether a pregnant woman has an
inalienable right to bodily integrity and self-defense against the aggression
of an unwanted fetus, consideration must be given to pregnancies which
jeopardize the life or health of the expectant mother and those which
arise from rape.
If a woman suffers from a medical malady such that pregnancy,
childbirth or post natal care of a child would jeopardize her health,
abortion may be available to her. Certainly this is true when her life is
at stake.68
to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take
afterwards by such limitation, as if it were actually born. And in this point the
Civil law agrees with ours.
Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MIcH. L. Rxv. 579, 581 (1965), citing 1 BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES, 129-30 (4th ed. 1771).
57. Reingold, supra note 2, at 298.
58. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.25, 125.30, 125.40, 125.45, 1050 (1967).
59. Gordon, supra note 56.
60. PROS AND CONS OF THERAPEUTIC ABORTION ACT, SB 462 (excerpts from
the hearings of the Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure, June 20,
1964, held in San Francisco on the Humane Abortion Act, AB 2310), Arguments For,
at 9, noted in Leavy & Charles, California's New Therapeutic Abortion Act: An
Analysis and Guide to Medical and Legal Procedure, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1967).
61. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334
(1949).
62. Id.
63. In Rex v. Bourne, 1 K.B. 687 (1938), Justice McNaughton's charge to the
jury stated: "The unborn child in the womb must not be destroyed unless the
destruction of the child is for the purpose of preserving the yet more precious life of
the mother."
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If a woman is the victim of a criminal rape, it would seem that the
aggression to her bodily integrity is compounded. The medical and
psychological problems become even more severe since two aggressors
exist-the rapist and the unwanted fetus which is the product of the rape.
As indicated previously,6 4 several states now permit abortion in certain
cases of forcible rape.65 Yet, to show the need for abortion in regard to
the mother's mental health may not be enough. If the unborn child is
held to be a "person" within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment,
something more awesome than a statutory device such as these states
employ will be necessary to counteract and ultimately supercede the con-
stitutional consequences of such personage. Therefore, statutes such as
the one included in the New York Criminal Code before its 1967
revision,6 which would afford a woman abortion rights on the premise
of self-defense could not stand. If the unborn child has a right to birth,
the statutory consideration must succumb to the constitutional one.6 7
The prospective mother's right of self-defense may, however, be
constitutionally supported in two ways-the courts may find that statutory
provisions afford due process of law sufficient to justify the killing of the
fetus to save the life of the mother; or the courts may interpret the
Ninth Amendment as containing the right to self-defense on the basis
of the phrase: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights,
64. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951(c) (2) (West Supp. 1967); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, art. 2, § 50 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44.45 (1967); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1968) ; GA. CODE ANN. 26-1102 (1968).
65. CAL. H.ALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (c) (2) (West Supp. 1967); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, art. 2, § 50 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44.45 (1967);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1968) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1102 (1968).
The legislatures of Georgia and Maryland have passed liberalized abortion
statutes; at this writing, both bills are awaiting gubernatorial action and
both are expected to become law. The legislation is similar to laws previously
enacted in Colorado, North Carolina, and California. Both the Georgia and
Maryland laws would permit abortion to protect the mental or physical health
of the mother, to prevent the birth of a defective infant and to terminate
pregnancies resulting from rape. The Georgia law contains stringent re-
quirements for eligibility: the woman must be a state resident and the
abortion must be approved by three physicians and the medical staff of an
accredited hospital. In Maryland, the only requirement is that the abortion
be approved by a hospital board, making this law the most liberal in the
nation. A California legislative study has shown that 254 abortions were
performed during the first two months the state's new abortion law was in
effect-most of them to save the health of the mother. Only four of them
were performed on out-of-state residents though the law's opponents had
warned that the state would become an "abortion mill."
Playboy Magazine, June, 1968, at 55
66. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 80, 81, 81-a, 82 (1944).
67. The Constitution of the United States provides that it "shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST.
art. VI.
et al.: Constitutional Aspects of Present Criminal Abortion Law
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1968
ABORTION LAW
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.""8
If residual powers inhere in the people, it is of little consequence that
the manner of approach is not clearly outlined. Whether one follows the
Goldberg approach in linking the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments,69
or whether one accepts Justice Douglas' view of penumbra 0 surround-
ing the various constitutional articles, has no bearing upon the existence
of the right. These views affect only the decision as to which article will
apply. It is difficult to find a more basic premise for life than the defense
of life itself. If any rights are retained by the people through the Ninth
Amendment, then certainly self-defense must be such a right.
The Right of Marital Privacy
With the advent of Griswold v. Connecticut" and the recent
tendency of the Supreme Court to maintain a vigil as guardian of individ-
ual rights, the right of privacy has gained prominence in both civil and
constitutional cases."' Therefore, it becomes relevant to determine wheth-
er there is a constitutional right of privacy emanating from the marriage
relationship; and, if so, whether proscription of abortive conduct by the
state constitutes a violation of that right of marital privacy.
The right of privacy is difficult to analyze because of the absence of
known limits. Such a right does not appear explicitly in the Constitution,
but was found to exist by implication by the court in Griswold.7
Dean Robert Drinan would set the limits of privacy broadly and
without terse, definitive reins:
Every married couple possesses a moral and a legal right to
privacy from any undue interference from the state. This right,
emphasized by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut, involving the Connecticut birth control statute,
should be as broad and as conclusive as is consistent with the
good of society. The right to have, or not to have, children and
to determine the number of such children are matters into which
the state by general agreement should not interfere.74
68. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
69. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487-99 (1965).
70. Id. at 480-87.
71. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
72. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.,
18 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 221 N.E.2d 543, 545, 234 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879, rev'd on other grounds,
387 U.S. 374 (1967) ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
73. 381 U.S. at 481; see also 17 W. REs. L. REV. 601, 602-03 (1965).
601, 602-03 (1965).
74. Drinan, supra note 2, at 474.
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But this is only to argue what the law should be. It does not seem to
explain the method of arriving at this point within a constitutional
framework.
Background of the Ninth Amendment
The key to future determinations presently rests with the Griswold
case, and to discuss Griswold some background material concerning the
Ninth Amendment and privacy are required. The Ninth Amendment was
for years treated as a meaningless appendage to the Constitution.7
In 1833, the Supreme Court held that the protection of the first ten
amendments could not be extended as a restraint upon the states.76
A later case,77 following the same reasoning, reached the same conclusion
with specific reference to the Ninth Amendment. In Loan Association v.
Topeka,'M the Supreme Court appeared to recognize that the Ninth
Amendment acknowledged certain rights, fundamental in a free society,
that could not be infringed upon. In 1947, the court found that the Ninth
Amendment protected the fundamental and inherent "right of a citizen
to ... further his own political views."7 " These cases set the stage for
Griswold's interpretation of the Ninth Amendment.
The zones of privacy relevant to Griswold include freedom of
association" and security in the sanctity of the home.8' The function of
the Ninth Amendment in terms of the right of privacy have been inter-
preted by Professor Sutelan thusly:
[I]t appears that the Ninth Amendment was meant to possess
two primary functions. First it was to be a statement of intent;
an intention that the enumeration of certain rights in the first
eight amendments was not to be exhaustive but that those
fundamental though unenumerated rights were nevertheless
meant to be protected. Secondly, it was meant to be a statement
of direction; directing the judiciary back to the "due process
of law" clause of the Fifth Amendment and later toward the
same clause in the Fourteenth Amendment and imploring them
for a broad interpretation of that clause in the protection of
75. Sutelan, The Ninth Amendment: Guidepost to Fundamental Rights, 8 Wm.
& MARY L. REV. 101, 102-10 (1966).
76. Id. at 107, citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 250 (1833).
77. Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 468 (1833).
78. Sutelan, supra note 75, at 107, citing 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
79. Sutelan, supra note 75, at 110, citing United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947).
80. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 430-33 (1963), noted in 17 W. REs. L. Rzv. 601, 603 (1965).
81. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
(1961), noted in 17 W. REs. L. REv. 601, 603 (1965).
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those fundamental, unenumerated rights inherent in all individ-
uals in a free society."2
Sutelan expands upon this view of the function of the Ninth
Amendment by analyzing the reasons for its insertion into the Bill of
Rights and the purpose for which it was promulgated. He conceives the
Ninth as a guidepost securing to all persons safeguards against govern-
mental actions of an unreasonable and arbitrary nature."3 Sutelan con-
cludes that a strict interpretation of the Constitution which would imple-
ment only specifically included rights improperly ignores the Ninth
Amendment and the broad scope of the protection intended by the
framers in the due process clause." Still, Sutelan does not regard the
Ninth Amendment as being omnipotent:
However this is not to say that the Ninth Amendment contains
an independent source of rights which should be applied against
the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment or that it
should be applied in total against the federal government. It
merely gives to the judiciary direction toward the provision
designed for the protection of fundamental rights.8 5
Justice Black, in a lecture given at New York University86 made a
partial disclosure of his theory of "absolutes" in the Bill of Rights, and
in so doing tendered a syllabus of his view of the function of the Ninth
Amendment.
Number Nine attempts to make certain that the enumeration
of some rights must not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people. The use of the words "the people"
in both the Amendments (9th and 10th) strongly emphasizes
the desire of the Framers to protect individual liberty.8
Justice Black prefaced this comment with an all important assertion:
"I believe that by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the first ten
amendments are now applicable to the states... ."8 From Black's
dissent in Griswold9 one may reasonably infer that he does not believe
in the right of privacy as a fundamental right retained by the people;




86. Address by Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black, James Madison Lecture, February
17, 1960, in 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 865 (1960).
87. Id. at 871.
88. Id. at 866.
89. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497, 507-20 (1965).
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but if he had so believed, he might well have used the Ninth to strike
down the Connecticut birth control law.
The Griswold Case
A large measure of the complexity presented by Griswold is created
by the use of the Ninth Amendment in relation to the concept of privacy.
The case holds that the Constitution does protect essential freedoms of
the individual and among those essential freedoms is a right of marital
privacy." The vehicles the court used to arrive at the case holding are
not clearly defined. Justice Douglas used the penumbra theory, finding
zones of privacy in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amend-
ments.91 But he went beyond consideration of the Bill of Rights or the
Constitution itself. He concluded his opinion with a humanistic reference
to the marital relationship:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-
older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hope-
fully enduring and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a har-
mony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior discussions.92
A concurring opinion written by Justice Goldberg, with whom
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined, is based upon the
Ninth Amendment as it fortifies the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.93
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion is predicated upon his view that
the Connecticut birth control enactment infringes upon the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby violates the basic
values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."9  Harlan makes no
mention of the Ninth Amendment or the right of privacy, yet it is dif-
ficult to envision what basic value was violated if not marital privacy.
Mr. Justice White concurred in the result, viewing Connecticut's
aiding and abetting statute as being in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment by depriving married couples of "liberty" without due
process of law.95
90. Id. at 482.
91. Id. at 484-85.
92. Id. at 486.
93. Id. at 493.
94. Id. at 500.
95. Id. at 502. White indicates that such encroachment on personal liberty re-
quires great justification by the state. Id. at 504.
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Justice Black and Justice Stewart dissented, being unable to perceive
a right of privacy in the Constitution." They saw the problem as one
in the legislative domain, inappropriate for interference by the Court.9"
Thus, five members of the Court recognized a right of privacy,
two refused to accept the right as constitutional doctrine and one member
remained in "limbo.""8  Because of recent changes in Court member-
ship any prognostication about the right of privacy in terms of abortion
law would be highly speculative at best. It appears, however, that the
right of privacy itself would survive the present Court for two reasons:
first, the reasoning used in the Douglas and Goldberg opinions is
logically appealing; secondly, the trend of the law, both civil and criminal,
is toward securing a broader scope of rights to the individual.
The Griswold case has been the target of the preceding analysis
for several reasons. Since the constitutionality of criminal abortion law
is in issue and since no cases have been decided on the specific subject,
the most analogous material compels scrutiny. Leavy and Kummer
present a comparison of the Connecticut birth control statute and anti-
abortion legislation showing:
(1) both statutes are at war with currently accepted standards
of medical practice; (2) both statutes invade the sacred realm
of marital privacy by denying married couples the right to plan
the future of their family; (3) both statutes force the birth of
deformed children, or leave abstinence as the alternative; (4)
both statutes are largely unenforced, nevertheless prosecution
hangs like a cloud over the medical profession; (5) both
statutes result in discrimination against people in lower income
economic brackets; (6) both statutes are in conflict with one
of the world's most critical problems today, the population
explosion; (7) both statutes involve the imposition of a reli-
gious principle on the entire community by government sanc-
tion.9"
Due to the many similarities between the laws regulating abortion
and those regulating contraception, Chief Justice Weintraub of the New
Jersey Supreme Court reduced these two fields to a common denomina-
tor in his dissenting opinion to the recent case of Gleitman v. Cos-
96. Id. at 507, 527 (joint dissents).
97. Id.
98. See notes 90-97 supra and accompanying text.
99. Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis: Therapeutic Abortion
and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 O.S.L.J. 647, 674 (1966).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1968], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol3/iss1/7
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
grove.' The courts may well rely on Griswold in deciding abortion
cases; and it seems clear that the Griswold arguments will be advanced
with vigor by the advocates of reform.
If the courts follow Griswold and if they hold the majority and
concurring opinions in esteem, it would appear that a right of privacy
does emanate from the marriage relationship and thereby estops pro-
scriptive action by the state without greater justification than a moral
basis. 1 '
Physician-Patient Privacy
Closely analogous to the problem of marital privacy is the matter
of physician-patient privacy. In Griswold, a physician was permitted
to raise the issue of the constitutional rights of his patients."2 In so do-
ing, a possible foundation was laid for expansion of the right of privacy,
i.e., does a constitutional right of privacy emanate from the physician-
patient relationship? If so, does state proscription of abortive conduct or
medical counsel regarding abortive conduct violate that right of physician-
patient privacy?
The doctor's evidentiary privilege of nondisclosure is closely re-
lated to the right of marital privacy. The reasons for both are analogous
-as in the marriage relationship, the patient must have complete con-
fidence in the doctor to create a deeply rooted trust sufficient to en-
courage uninhibited communication." ° This proposition was supported
in a case0 . which involved a New York Sanitary Code provision
100. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (This quotation
appears in part in the text accompanying note 3 supra and is repeated due to its
dual meaning.)
Contraception and abortion have this in common, that whereas in most areas
of criminal prohibition the fact of evil is evident to most people, here there
is evil or none at all depending wholly upon a spiritual supposition, for while
men agree it is wrong to take life, yet knowing nothing about the void before
or after their earthly presence, they cannot agree upon the point at which a
living thing should be thought to be human in its being. We know there is
"life" in the ovum and sperm before conception, but as to the morality of
contraception, every argument starts from and returns to an ethical or religious
assumption. Hence he who opposes and he who supports contraception is
equally sure he serves the dignity of man. And so as to abortion, men cannot
agree upon the stage at which an embryo or fetus has a claim to acquire life
in human form strong enough to override a woman's right to her own bodily
integrity. It is not surprising, therefore, that legislators were able to agree
only upon such vagueness as "without just cause" and "without legal
justification."
227 A.2d at 709.
101. See Drinan, supra note 2, at 475.
102. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380a. (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
104. Application of Grand Jury of the County of Kings, 286 App. Div. 270, 143
N.Y.S.2d 501 (1965).
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which required immediate notification to the Department of Health by
hospital officials in cases where abortion or miscarriage was either dis-
covered or expected. The court found that these requirements annulled
the operation of general statutory provisions against disclosure by a
physician of information acquired while attending a person in a pro-
fessional capacity.' The court also held that the hospital was not
required to submit all records in abortion cases for grand jury inspec-
tion. The court stated:
The statutory prohibitions governing the relation of doctor and
patient or attorney and client "express a long-standing public
policy to encourage uninhibited communications between per-
sons standing in a relation of trust," and in the court's effectua-
tion of such policy, "the statutes are accorded a broad and lib-
eral construction" and the privileged communications are zeal-
ously guarded.'0 6
A New York court affirmed this view as recently as 1966, when an
indictment for an artificial and criminally induced abortion was dis-
missed.1 7 The court found that the New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure affords a privilege of nondisclosure of communications acquired
in the course of examination and treatment. 08
Nevertheless, there is great disparity between a rule of evidence and
a constitutional right. Whether this rule may be elevated to the latter
level is unknown. Yet, comparatively recent decisions have overlapped
rules of evidence and constitutional rights when the rules are so funda-
mental to our jurisprudential function that they are considered to be the
elementary essentials of due process. 9
It would seem that in an abortion prosecution the liberty of both
doctor and patient are at stake because of the criminal sanctions which
may be invoked. Also at stake is the intangible property right of the
doctor to pursue his profession. Perhaps most serious, however, may be
the danger to the life of the patient who, denied an abortion, feels com-
pelled to seek out a back-street abortionist. Thus, there may be a failure
to meet the due process requirement if abortion laws are violative of
physician-patient privacy rights.
105. Id. at 503.
106. Id. citinlg People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 455, 126 N.E.2d 559, 561 (1955).
107. People v. McAlpin, 50 Misc. 2d 579, 270 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1966).
108. Id.
109. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507
(1967).
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Assuming that the marital right of privacy sets a precedent for the
physician-patient right, two arguments are forthcoming. First, physician-
patient privacy, in relation to its constitutional treatment, is part-and-
parcel of the marital right, in which the husband and wife exchange
knowledge or matter sacred to them, but in the presence of a confidential
advisor. Considering the nature of the discussion, the matter is not made
less sacred by the presence of this third party; and since the state has
recognized the integrity of the advisor by licensing him as a professional,
the private aspect of the matter is not jeopardized. Second, the pro-
position may be advanced that physician-patient communications are
entitled to privacy in their own right for the same reasons as privacy is
accorded the marital right."' Since the purpose behind the right is to
avoid "intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude or into his
private affairs . . . ,"" compelling the physician to testify would effect
a contrary result, and thereby irreparably impair the rights of the patient
and perhaps those of the doctor as well.
This position, however, is subject to severe criticism. It has not
been established that marital privacy embodies the right to abort. There
is no evidence of cases holding to the effect that physician-patient
privacy, where it exists, is part-and-parcel of any marital right. Further-
more, it is wise to distinguish between privilege and right; the former
being capable of revision or even revocation, the latter being capable of
resisting even the most vehement attack. Finally, marital privacy cannot
be used as valid precedent since the marriage relationship is entirely
different from, and far more intimate than, the physician-patient relation-
ship.
The decision on this issue should depend upon the procreative
effects of Griswold. It is certain that the state courts of the United States
will not recognize a right emanating from a privilege which they do not
recognize. But it is also true that the Supreme Court has the power to
make a decision which will be binding upon those same state courts.1
Thus, it is submitted, if the "victim of violence" patient (gunshot
wound, knife wound, etc.) can be distinguished from the woman desiring
an abortion for any reason whatsoever,"1 the physician-patient privacy
110. See notes 102-08 supra and accompanying text.
111. EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 901-03 (1967).
112. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct.
507 (1967).
113. Such a distinction is necessary to preserve the medical profession's invaluable
contribution to the enforcement of criminal law, i.e., reporting treatment for gunshot
wounds, sharp instrument wounds, narcotic addiction treatment. Reporting these types
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argument should have success.
Proscription v. Administration and Receipt of Best Care
In the past, courts have not only recognized the doctor's right to
practice his profession, but have also required him to exercise his skill
in accordance with the principles established by the medical profession
for the betterment of his patient.11 Yet, state proscription of abortive
conduct or medical counsel regarding abortive conduct would seem to
interfere with the doctor's exercise of this right and duty. The American
Civil Liberties Union and the Association for the Study of Abortion
regard the doctor's choice to abort as a civil right :"'
They [abortion laws] impair the right of physicians to practice
in accordance with their professional obligation in that they
require doctors not to perform a necessary medical procedure
because the statutory prohibitions on abortion would amount to
malpractice in the absence of those prohibitions." 6
The case law that is concerned with the doctor's right to practice
medicine to the best of his ability offers no uniform guideline.""
of treatment has not been successfully attacked on constitutional grounds, the rationale
being that the public welfare is far more critical than the deprivation of a personal
right or the Hippocratic Oath. See 1 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 2.04, 2.15(1959); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
114. See United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936).
115. Association for the Study of Abortion, Newsletter, Vol. III, No. 2, at 3
(Summer 1968).
116. Id.
117. The conflict 'between the cases is presented by a comparison between Walden
v. Jones, 289 Ky. 395, 158 S.W.2d 609 (1942) and United States v. Freund,
290 F. 411 (D. Mont. 1923), which favor greater discretion for doctors and The Slaugh-
terhouse Cases, 6 U.S. (Wall.) 36 (1873) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)
which appear to oppose discretion in the professions. One Package presented a libel filed
by the United States against a package of 120 vaginal pessaires allegedly imported con-
trary to the Tariff Act of 1930. From a decree dismissing the libel, the United States
appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. The claimant, Dr. Stone, a
New York gynecologist, ordered the pessaires for her practice. The court found that
the purpose of the statute was not to prevent the sale, importation or carriage by mail
of things which can intelligently be used by conscientious physicians to save life or
promote the well-being of patients. 86 F.2d at 739. Walden v. Jones was a civil action
brought by a one-year-old child for the alleged negligence of a physician in failing to
place silver nitrate in his eyes at birth. From a $5,000 judgment for the child, the
defendant doctor appealed. The dictum in the case indicated that the standard of know-
ledge, skill and required care which physicians must possess and exercise is such reason-
able and ordinary knowledge, skill and diligence as physicians in similar neighborhoods
and surroundings ordinarily use under like circumstances. In United States v. Freund,
provisions of the National Prohibition Act limiting the right of a physician to
prescribe only one-half pint of alcohol within any ten day period is invalid as depriving
physicians and patients of their liberty without due process of law within the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution. The court said:
It is an extravagant and unreasonable attempt to subordinate the judgment
of the attending physician to that of Congress, in respect to matters with
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However, the issue may again be raised in the California case of Shively
v. Stewart,"' in which the California State Board of Medical Examiners
has charged nine prominent San Francisco doctors with unprofessional
conduct for inducing illegal abortions." 9 The California Supreme Court
remanded the case for discovery purposes and has not yet determined the
issue.12 The restrictions on medical care should be considered if
Shively v. Stewart". is revived. Excerpts of the amicae curiae brief
clearly indicate the need for decision.'22
Another factor to be considered is that medical science has so
advanced that an abortion can now be performed which is virtually free
of danger to the pregnant woman. 2' Denying abortion for fetal de-
formity may impose arbitrary and unreasonable classifications which may
deny the parents the advantages of currently accepted medical judg-
ment.' While prevailing case law should not be solely determinative of
the issue, when coupled with persuasive views on the basic inclusions of
the Ninth Amendment, the result could well be an argument which is
both logical and appealing.' 2'
which the former alone is competent to deal, and infringes upon the duty of
the physician to prescribe in accord with his honest judgment and upon the
right of the patient to receive the benefit of the judgment of the physician of
his choice. . . . The physician, with power to begin a course of treatment,
must have like power to finish it. His judgment to begin must be unrestricted
to conduct and finish.
290 F. at 414. The court found the provision in question to be an arbitrary and
unreasonable interference with the lawful property and personal right of the physicians
to prescribe alcohol for remedial purposes, and for ailing persons to receive it.
The Slaughterhouse Cases stand for the proposition that the State has the right
to regulate an economic calling (in that case a butcher business). In Ferguson v.
Skrupa, the Supreme Court found no fault with the state regulation of debt adjusting.
Justice Black, writing the majority opinion said, "It is now settled that States have
power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal
commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some
specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law." 372 U.S. at
730-31.
Several distinctions should be mentioned. There is a material difference between a
purely economic business and the practice of medicine. When Slaughterhouse was
decided, the Fourteenth Amendment was but an infant. No doubt the state can and
should control the medical profession to a degree but should that control extend to the
internal operations of medical practice to touch upon both diagnosis and treatment as
well as objective standards of proficiency to merit licensing?
118. 55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 421 P.2d 65 (1967).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 221.
121. Id.
122. Leavy & Charles, supra note 60, at 26.
123. L. LADEn, supra note 1, at 17-23.
124. Leavy & Charles, supra note 60, at 25. See also United States v. One
Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936) ; United States v. Freund, 290 F. 411, 413 (D. Mont.
1923) ; Walden v. Jones, 289 Ky. 395, 158 S.W.2d 609 (1942).
125. The denial of the right to best medical care is very similar to the problem
posed by denying women the choice for which their bodies are to be used. Does the
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to expose the dominant con-
stitutional issues which are most likely to arise as an incident to any
given criminal abortion statute. However, even a complete analysis of
these issues has only limited value.12" ' A case must be heard by the
Supreme Court of the United States before the merit of the issues
presented can be evaluated properly. It is submitted that the foregoing
questions are those most likely to arise in the near future and most likely
to be determinative in the courts' consideration.'2 7  It is also submitted
that the collective body of American therapeutic abortion law may be
unconstitutional. This position is taken because of the non-person status
of the fetus, the recent progression of the right of privacy as a truly basic
freedom and the absence of certainty with which therapeutic abortion
law is drafted, administered and unenforced.
state thus compel procreation without due process of law? See notes 15 and 104 supra
and accompanying text.
126. Other issues may arise under any given abortion statute. Do criminal
abortion laws deny equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the lower strata
socio-economic groups? JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, JR. FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 96. Do
crimnial abortion laws violate the First Amendment clause which guarantees a separa-
tion between church and state by prohibiting the establishment of religion JOSEPH P.
KENNEDY, JR. FOUNDATION, supra, note 6, at 96. Do those criminal abortion statutes,
such as the California Abortion Act, which provide for final determination on the per-
missibility of abortion by an administrative body, deny due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment? Cf. Calif. Senate Bill No. 462, Chapter 11, at 25952-53. Do
the residence requirements of abortion laws violate equal protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment? See generally Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) ; Harrell
v. Board of Commissioners, 269 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1967); Thompson v. Shapiro,
270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn 1967) ; Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ;
Green v. Dept. of Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967). Is the wording of such
phrases as "unlawful" and "without lawful justification" so vague and indefinite as to
deny due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to convicted physicians? See
Association for the Study of Abortion, Newsletter, Vol. III, No. 2, at 3 (1968).
127. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, COLLECTED PAPERS 238-39
(1920), Foreward to E. ROsTOW, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE QUEST FOR LAW (1962).
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